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INTRODUCTION

There is perhaps no relationship that is more fundamental and
emotional than that between parent and child. The term "child"
has such a well-established meaning for most of us that we think
of it as needing no definition.
Nevertheless, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Act)
defines "child" in a way that is complex and, in some instances,
unusual., In addition to a legitimate child, the definition encompasses, under certain specified conditions, a stepchild, a legitimated child, an illegitimate child in relationship to its mother, an
adopted child, and an orphan. This definition is the key to determining various relationships that lead to preferred treatment
under the immigration laws. 2 The cases interpreting and applying
1. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 101(b) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1)
(1976) [the Immigration and Nationality Act is hereinafter cited as I. & N. Act],
provides:
(b) (1) The term 'child' means an unmarried person under twenty-one
years of age who is(A) a legitimate child; or
(B) a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the child
had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred, or
(C) a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, or under the law of the father's residence or domicile, whether in or
outside the United States, if such legitimation takes place before the child
reaches the age of eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of
the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such legitimation. [; or]
(D) an illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child
to its natural mother; [or]
(E) a child adopted while under the age of fourteen years if the child
has thereafter been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the
adopting parent or parents for at least two years: Provided,That no natural parent of any such adopted child shall thereafter, by virtue of such
parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this chapter.
[;or]
(F) a child,. . who is an orphan ....
A different definition of "child" applies to the nationality provisions contained in
Title III of the L &N. Act. Id § 101(c) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (1).
2. The Act defines "parent" in terms of its definition of "child." Id. §
101(b) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (2). Children of United States citizens and parents of
United States citizens over the age of 21 are defined as "immediate relatives."
They are thereby exempt from both the numerical limitations and the labor certification requirements for immigration. Id. § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b). Unmarried
sons and daughters of United States citizens have first preference in the allocation
of immigrant visas. Id. § 203(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1). Unmarried sons and
daughters of lawful permanent resident aliens are given second preference in immigrant visa allocation. Id, § 203(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2). Married sons and
daughters of United States citizens have fourth preference in the allocation of immigrant visas. Id. § 203(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(4). Brothers and sisters of
United States citizens who are over the age of 21 constitute the fifth preference in
immigrant visa allocation. Id. § 203(a) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (5). The foregoing
classes of preference immigrants are also exempt from the labor certification requirements. The definition of "child" is used in determining whether an alien
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the definition of "child" are among the most difficult that the administrative authorities must decide under the Act. This is especially true in situations involving those unfortunate children born
out of wedlock.
The Act excludes natural fathers and their illegitimate children
from the scheme for preferred immigration status. As a result of
the limitations imposed by the statute and by the administrative
cases interpreting it, some children who are considered legitimate
or legitimated under their own state or foreign law are not so recognized for the purpose of obtaining benefits under the Act.
There is a trend in the law in general toward more favorable
treatment for children born out of wedlock and for their natural
fathers. 3 This trend, however, does not appear to have carried
over into the field of immigration law.4
LEGrriMATE OR ILLEGITImATE?

The question of whether an alien child is "legitimate," "legitimated," or "illegitimate" is extremely important under the Act.
An alien legitimate child of a United States citizen or of a lawful
permanent resident alien may qualify for benefits through section
101(b)(1)(A)5 of the Act without fulfilling any other requirements. In contrast, an alien illegitimate child may attain status
only by claiming through his natural mother, or through his
natural father if the child is legitimated in accordance with section 101(b)(1) (C),6 or if the child is a stepchild under section
101(b) (1) (B).7
The term "legitimate" is not defined in the Act. For immigration purposes, legitimacy generally is determined according to the
qualifies as a "son" or "daughter," Nazareno v. Attorney General, 512 F.2d 936
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975), as well as in determining whether an
alien qualifies as a "brother" or "sister." In re Hueng, LD. No. 2334 (1974).
3. Several states have eliminated legal distinctions based on legitimacy. See,
e.g., Amz. REV. STAT. § 8-601 (West Supp. 1977); CAI. CIV. CODE §§ 7001-7002 (West
Supp. 1978); OIL REv. STAT. § 109.060 (1977). Several Supreme Court decisions
have expanded the rights of illegitimate children and of their natural fathers. See,
e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 408 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
4. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (A) (1976). See note 1 supra.
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (C) (1976). See note 1 supra.
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (B) (1976). See note 1 supra.

law of the place of birth. Thus, children of a polygamous marriage
may be considered legitimate if they were born in a country
where polygamy was legal. 8 Likewise, children of certain concubines who are considered legitimate under the applicable domestic law are considered legitimate for immigration purposes. 9
One of the earliest cases discussing the concept of legitimacy
under the Act is In re B-S,iO which involved a child born out of
wedlock in China seeking status through his mother. The law in
effect at the time of the child's birth in 1931 was article 1065 of the
Civil Code of the Republic of China, which provided that every
child is legitimate in relationship to his (or her) mother. The case
arose in 1954, prior to the amendment" of the Act which made an
illegitimate child the "child" of his mother. Therefore, the granting of status depended upon whether the child could be considered a "legitimate child" of the mother under section
101(b) (1) (A) of the Act.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) argued that
under various dictionary definitions and general United States
standards the term "legitimate" must be limited to children born
in wedlock. The INS also argued that Congress must have intended that "legitimate" be given the meaning understood in the
United States and that it should be construed without reference
to foreign law. To recognize the relationship created under Chinese law, the INS asserted, would result in preferential treatment
of children born in China over children born out of wedlock in the
United States and elsewhere.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board)12 rejected the INS
arguments, stating that in light of the plain language of section
101(b) (1) (A) "there is no need to engage in the nebulous process
of ascertaining Congressional intent."' 3 The Board cited the well8. In re Mahal, 12 L & N. Dec. 409 (1967).
9. In re K-W-S, 9 L & N. Dec. 396 (1961) (decided by Att'y Gen.); In re
Kwong, I.D. No. 2387 (1975).
10. 6 L & N. Dec. 305 (1954) (afl'd by Att'y Gen. 1955).
11. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 2, 71 Stat. 639 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b) (1) (D) (1976)).
12. INS District Directors have jurisdiction to grant or deny applications for
immediate relative and preference classification (known as visa petitions) under
the L & N. Act. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.1(n), 204.1(a) (1978). Appeals from denials of visa
petitions (with certain exceptions not relevant here) may be taken to the Board of
Immigration Appeals. Id. § 3.1(b) (5). The Board is an independent, quasi-judicial
body within the Department of Justice consisting of a Chairman and four Board
members appointed by the Attorney General. Id. § 3.1(a). For further information
about the Board and its functions, see Milhollan, The Work of the Board, 54 IrmPRETER RELEASEs 322 (1977); Roberts, The Board of ImmigrationAppeals: A Critical Appraisal,15 SAN DiEGO L REv. 29 (1977).
13. 6 L & N. Dec. at 308-09.
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established rule that legitimacy or illegitimacy is governed by
the law of the place of birth. The Board further found that
"[1]egitimacy once created by proper law should everywhere be
recognized."14

In approving the petition for status, the Board noted that there
is no public policy forbidding recognition of a relationship of legit-

imacy where identity of the parents is known and that, in fact, the
law favors recognizing the status of legitimacy whenever possible.
The Board concluded by stating that "there is no reason to assume that Congress in using the word 'legitimate' intended to
limit it to a dictionary definition when the great body of case law
and authoritative writings indicate a widespread acceptance of
the liberal interpretation of the term."15 The Board's ruling in In
re B-S was affirmed by the Attorney General.16
Subsequent cases, while somewhat blurring the distinction between "legitimate" and "legitimated," adhered to the notion that
legitimacy created under the law of the place of birth should be
recognized. For instance, In re K.17 involved a child who had
been born out of wedlock in Poland. A Polish constitutional provision had abolished the status of illegitimacy and made all children born in the country legitimate. The Board held that the
child could qualify as a "legitimate or legitimated" child, evidently drawing no meaningful distinction between the terms.
In a later case, the Board held that a child born out of wedlock
and acknowledged by the father was "legitimate" under the law of
Poland and for immigration purposes.18 Similar conclusions were
reached in cases involving children born out of wedlock in Yugoslavia 19 and in Panama, 20 both of which had abolished the status
2
of illegitimacy. 1
However, in In re Kubicka,22 another case involving the law of
Poland, the Board qualified its earlier holdings. The Board concluded that the term "legitimate" as used in section 101(b) (1) (A)
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
See Id.
8 I. & N. Dec. 73 (1958).
In re Chojnowski, 11 I. & N. Dec. 287 (1965).
In re Jancar, 11 I. & N. Dec. 365 (1965).
In re Sinclair, 13 I. & N. Dec. 613 (1970).
See also In re G., 9 L & N. Dec. 518 (1961) (status of illegitimacy abolished

in Hungary).
22. 14 L &N. Dec. 303 (1972).

refers solely to a child "born in wedlock." 23 Relying on Webster's
Dictionary, the Board adopted as a federal standard the same
definition it had rejected in In re B-S. Noting the contrary language in In re K., the Board found that it "should more corectly
have stated in Matter of K- that a child born out of wedlock recognized by the father as his own in accordance with the law of Poland, becomes the father's 'legitimated' child, rather than his
'
'legitimate' child. 24
In Kubicka the petition was granted because the Board found
that the requirements for legitimation by the father under section
101(b) (1) (C) of the Act had been met. The full significance of the
Board's distinction between "legitimate" and "legitimated" did
not become apparent until In re Dela Rosa.25 In Dela Rosa the
Board denied status to a child concededly legitimate under the
law of Panama on the ground that she had not been in her father's "legal custody" at the time he had acknowledged her and
therefore did not meet the requirements for legitimation under
2
section 101(b) (1) (C) of the Act. 6
In re Lo27 involved an alien who claimed the benefit of article
15 of the Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China. 28 The
petitioner argued that article 15 abolished all legal distinctions between children born in wedlock and children born out of wedlock.
However, the Board held that the People's Republic of China continues to distinguish between children born in wedlock and those
born out of wedlock and that the paternity of the child involved
had never been "legally established" in accordance with article 15.
The Board therefore found it unnecessary to decide whether "legally establishing" paternity under article 15 was the same as "legitimating" the child under section 101(b) (1) (C) of the Act.
In re Lo was followed in In re Chin Lau,29 an unpublished decision. In Chin Lau the petitioner advanced the claim that all chil23. Id. at 304.

24. Id.
25. 14 L & N. Dec. 728 (1974).
26. For a discussion of the legal custody requirement for legitimation, see
notes 74-98 and accompanying text infra.
27. 14 L & N. Dec. 379 (1973).

28. Article 15 of the Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China provides:
Children born out of wedlock shall enjoy the same rights as children
born in lawful wedlock. No person shall be allowed to harm them or discriminate against them. When the paternity of a child born out of wedlock
is legally established by the mother of the child or by other witnesses or
by other material evidence, the identified father must bear the whole or
part of the cost of maintenance and education of the child until the age of
eighteen.

Id. at 380.
29. File No. A20 122 881 (Oct. 23, 1974).
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dren born in the People's Republic of China are legitimate by
virtue of article 15. The Board rejected this argument, relying
upon Lo. Counsel also cited previous Board holdings that children born in countries that had abolished the status of illegitimacy could be granted status as legitimate or legitimated children
under the Act. 30 In rejecting this argument, the Board essentially
drew a factual distinction between those cases and Chin Lau.
Chin Lau reached the district court, and the Board's decision
was reversed. 31 The district judge agreed with the Board that the
People's Republic of China continues to distinguish between children born in wedlock and those born out of wedlock. However,
the court disagreed with the Board's conclusion that article 15 requires that paternity be "legally established" for the child to be
considered legitimate. The court found that it would be necessary
to "legally establish" paternity only in situations where the putative father denied the relationship, which was not true in the case
before it. The court went on to find that apparently there are no
provisions in Chinese law prescribing the method for legitimation
of children born out of wedlock and that therefore the terms "legitimate child" and "illegitimate child" are meaningless in the
context of the Chinese legal system. The court concluded, after
examining the legislative history of the Act, that it would be sufficient for the Act's purposes if the petitioner could prove the existence of the blood relationship between father and child.
The Government appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affimed the district court. 32 In doing so, the Second Circuit went beyond the ruling of the district judge and held
that all children born in the People's Republic of China are legitimate at birth. The court noted that legitimacy is a legal concept
that is dependent upon the law of the place of birth. The fact of
birth in or out of wedlock has no legal significance unless some
legal significance is attached to that fact by the law of the place of
birth. The court concluded that a child who is legitimate at birth
under article 15 qualifies as a legitimate child under section
101(b) (1) (A) of the Act. In the court's opinion, procedures for legitimation would have been superfluous in the context of the Chinese legal system.
30. In re G., 9 L &N. Dec. 518 (1961); In re K., 8 L &N. Dec. 73 (1958). See text
accompanying note 17 supra for a discussion of In re K.
31. Chin Lau v. Kiley, 410 F. Supp. 221 (S.DN.Y. 1976).
32. Chin Lau v. Kiley, 563 F.2d 543 .(2d Cir. 1977).

Notwithstanding Chin Lau, the Board has continued to hold
that the term "legitimate" refers solely to a child born in wedlock.33 However, in light of the Government's failure to seek
Supreme Court review of Chin Lau, it is likely that the Board will
34
consider itself bound in the Second Circuit by that decision.
If the child is not "legitimate" under the applicable law, it is
possible (although more difficult) for that child to achieve immigration status through his natural parents. The following section
discusses three methods by which an illegitimate child may attain
immigration status through his natural parents. First, status may
be attained through the natural mother. Second, a child may be
legitimated. Third, a child may become a stepchild.
THREE METHODS BY WHICH AN ILLEGITInATE CHILD MAY ATTAIN
IMMIGRATION STATUS THROUGH HIS NATURAL PARENTS

Attaining Status Through Natural Mother but Not Through
NaturalFather:Fiallo v. Bell
Immigration law prior to the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 gave preferred immigration status to children of United
States citizens but made no specific reference to illegitimate or legitimated children.3 5 The administrative construction was that an
illegitimate child could qualify for nonquota status through his
36
(or her) natural mother.
In developing the Act, Congress expressed a desire to preserve
and to reunite family units. 37 The definition of "child" was broadened to include "legitimated child"38 if the legitimation took place
under the law of the child's or father's residence or domicile prior
to the child's eighteenth birthday, and the child was in the legal
custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of legitimation. It was also broadened to include "stepchild" 39 when the
33. In re Clahar, LD. No. 2643 (1978); In re Reyes, LD. No. 2641 (1978). See also
In re Cortez, LD. No. 2603 (1977).
34. If the Government does not seek further review, the Board ordinarily considers itself bound within that jurisdiction by a circuit court's decision. In re Gonzalez, LD. No. 2564 (1977). The Board has departed from this general rule only in
very unusual circumstances. See, e.g., In re Mangabat, 14 L & N. Dec. 75 (1972).
35. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 4(a), 43 Stat. 155 (repealed 1952). See also id.

§ 28(m), which defined child in a negative manner as not including an adoptive relationship unless the adoption took place before January 1, 1924.
36. 22 C.F.R. § 41.209 (1949).
37. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 39 (1952); S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 467-68 (1950).
See also H.R. REP. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1957).
38. L & N. Act, ch. 477, § 101(b) (1) (C), 66 stat. 163 (1952) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (C) (1976)). For a discussion of legitimation, see text accompanying notes 51-98 infra.
39. L & N. Act, ch. 477, § 101(b) (1) (B), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (current version at 8
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marriage creating the relationship took place before the child's
eighteenth birthday.
Ironically, this broadening of the definition resulted in a ruling
by the Attorney General that an illegitimate child could no longer
be considered the "child" of his natural mother. 40 Congress ex4
pressed displeasure with this interpretation, but to no avail. 1
The law was amended in 1957 to specify that an illegitimate child
is the "child" of his natural mother 42 and that a stepchild is a
"child" regardless of whether he is legitimate or illegitimate.43
The reason Congress chose to treat natural fathers and their illegitimate children less favorably is not specified in either the legislative history of the 1952 Act or the 1957 amendments to the
definition of "child." Nevertheless, a portion of the legislative history, as well as the overall statutory scheme, suggest that Congress generally was concerned about the possible use of the
definition of "child" to evade quota restrictions and numerical
limitations on immigration. 4 4 Congress certainly was aware of the
inherent proof problems in paternity cases.45 In addition, it is
likely that Congress accepted the conventional view that illegitimate children do not have close ties to their natural fathers and
therefore do not come within the general rationale of reuniting
bona fide family units. 46
The constitutionality of the above-described statutory scheme
was challenged by the plaintiffs in Fiallo v. Bell,47 who alleged
that the denial of immigration benefits to natural fathers and
their illegitimate children violated the first, fifth, and ninth
amendments to the Constitution. The Supreme Court rejected
these arguments.
U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (B) (1976)). For a discussion of qualification as a stepchild, see
text accompanying notes 99-116 infra.
40. In re A., 5 L & N. Dec. 272 (1954). The Attorney General also ruled that the
illegitimate child of an alien woman who married a United States citizen could not
be considered the citizen's stepchild under the L & N. Act, ch. 477, § 101(b) (1) (B),
66 Stat. 163 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (B) (1976)). In re M., 5
L & N. Dec. 120 (1953).
41. S. REP. No. 1057, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1957); H.R. REP. No. 1199, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1957).
42. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 2, 71 Stat. 639 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b) (1) (D) (1976)).
43. Id. § 1 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (B) (1976)).
44. See S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 468 (1950).
45. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 & n.8 (1977).
46. See id.
47. Id.

Basically, the Court found that immigration cases are subject
only to a very limited scope of judicial review and that the distinctions drawn under the Act represent a legislative policy choice
with which it should not interfere. In other words, Congress has
virtually unlimited power to choose which aliens can enter the
country. The Court noted that "legislative distinctions in the immigration area need not be as "carefully tuned to alternative
considerations,"'.. . as those in the domestic area." 48
A dissenting opinion, written by Justice Marshall and concurred
in by Justices Brennan and White, accused the majority of having
devised a standard of review for immigration cases that in fact
constituted no review at all. 49 The dissent found that the statute
was an invidious discrimination against certain United States citizens who wished to bring their illegitimate children or their natural fathers to the United States but were prevented from doing so
by the statutory system.5 0
Legitimation: Three Requirements
If a child is neither "legitimate" under the relevant guidelines
nor able to claim status through his natural mother, he may still
be able to come within the Act's definition of "child" by claiming
through his natural father and fulfilling three requirements for legitimation: (1) sufficient acts of legitimation, (2) the age requirement, and (3) legal custody.
Sufficient Acts of Legitimation Under Section 101(b) (1) (C)
The Board has ruled that in order to be considered "legitimated" for immigration purposes, an illegitimate child must attain a status virtually identical to that of a legitimate child. Thus,
various forms of legal acknowledgement by the father that do not
confer rights equal to those of a legitimate child do not qualify the
child as legitimated under section 101(b) (1) (C).51 This is true
even when the act of acknowledgement makes the child equal in
all respects save those concerning succession. 52 However, the
Board has held that complete equality with respect to rights foreign to United States common law is not necessary for effective
48. Id (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977) (quoting Mathews
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976)).
49. Id. at 805 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 816.
51. See, e.g., In re Doble-Pena, 13 I. & N. Dec. 366 (1969); In re Mandewirth, 12
I. & N. Dec. 199 (1967); In re Van Pamelen, 12 I. & N. Dec. 11 (1966); In re Maungca,
11 L & N. Dec. 885 (1966); In re The, 10 L & N. Dec. 744 (1964).
52. Peignand v. INS, 440 F.2d 757 (1st Cir. 1971); In re Reyes, LD. No. 2641

(1978).
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53

legitimation.

If the applicable domestic law permits, a natural father may be
able to adopt his illegitimate child formally.54 In order to be effective for immigration purposes, the adoption must take place while
the child is under the age of fourteen. Also, the two-year custody
and residency requirements of section 101(b) (1) (E) of the Act
must be fulfilled.55 In one case, however, the Board held that an
overage adoption that took place between the ages of fourteen
and eighteen was a valid act of legitimation for the purposes of
section 101(b) (1) (C).56
Age Limitation
Section 101(b) (1) (C) specifies that legitimation must take place
under the law of the child's or father's residence or domicile
before the child reaches the age of eighteen.5 7 The eighteen-year
age limitation presumably was designed to preclude the possibility of fraudulent legitimation of adults in order to circumvent immigration restrictions.5 8 Because legitimation of an adult would
not involve support or maintenance obligations on the part of the
"legitimating parent," it could conceivably present an attractive
opportunity for fraud. In addition, Congress probably believed
that where the natural father had not performed legitimating acts
before his child reached the age of eighteen, it was likely that no
real family unit existed.
Under most domestic laws, the act of legitimation operates to
make the child legitimate from the date of birth. The Board has
not given legitimation such a retroactive effect because to do so
would negate the congressional intent behind the eighteen-year
age requirement.5 9
A number of interesting cases involving the age requirement
arose under former section 230 of the California Civil Code.60
That provision was repealed in 1975 when California adopted the
53. In re Lee, LD. No. 2606 (1977) (right to succeed to title "Head of Family" in
Korea).
54. In re Peters, 11 L & N. Dec. 691 (1966).
55. See generally In re M., 8 L & N. Dec. 118 (1959) (aff'd by Att'y Gen.).
56. In re Peters, 11 L & N. Dec. 691 (1966).
57. See note 1 supra.
58. See generally S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 468 (1950).
59. In re Cortez, I.D. No. 2603 (1977); In re Obando, I.D. No. 2600 (1977).
60. CAT. Crv. CODE § 230 (West 1954) (repealed 1975).

Uniform Parentage Act.61 However, the Board still applies section

230 to cases in which the alleged legitimating acts took place prior
to its repeal. 62 Section 230 provided that:
The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his

own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married,
into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child,
thereby adopts it as such; and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth ....63

Legitimation under this statute did not require a court decree.
California decisions have held that legitimating acts for section
230 purposes may have taken place outside the state.64 Administrative cases adopted this rationale and held that legitimation had
taken place under section 101(b) (1) (C) when the acts had been
performed in a foreign country, despite the fact that neither the
father nor the child had moved to California until many years
thereafter. 65
In In re Singh,66 the Board qualified these earlier holdings.
Singh involved a claim of legitimation under section 230 in which
neither the father nor the child had taken up residence or domicile in California prior to the child's eighteenth birthday. The
Board ruled that under such circumstances the parties could not
possibly meet the requirement that legitimation take place under
the law of the father's or the child's residence or domicile prior to
the child's eighteenth birthday.
Subsequently, the Board imposed further limitations upon the
application of section 230. In In re Buenaventura,67 the Board
held that notwithstanding that California makes no distinction
whether the legitimating acts took place while the parties, or one
of them, were domiciled in California, the language of section
101(b) (1) (C) requires that at the time the legitimating acts under
section 230 took place, the father or the child must have been a
resident or a domiciliary of California and the child must have
61. 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 693, § 11 (codified at CA,.Crv. CODE §§ 7000-7018 (West
Supp. 1978)). The Uniform Parentage Act states that: 'The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." CA. Crv. CODE § 7002 (West Supp. 1978). A man is
presumed to be the natural father if he receives the child into his home and
openly holds out the child as his own. Id. § 7004(a) (4).
62. In re Buenaventura, I.D. No. 2636 (1977).
63. Act of Mar. 11, 1872, CAL Crv. CODE § 230 (West 1954) (repealed 1975).
64. In re Estate of Lund, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945); see In re Garcia, 12
L & N. Dec. 628 (1968); In re Pableo, 12 L & N. Dec. 503 (1967) (decided by Dist.
Dir.).
65. In re Garcia, 12 I & N. Dec. 628 (1968); In re Pableo, 12 L & N. Dec. 503
(1967) (decided by Dist. Dir.); In re Palacio, 11 L & N. Dec. 183 (1965).
66. I.D. No. 2402 (1974).
67. LD. No. 2636 (1977).
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been under the age of eighteen. Prior decisions to the contrary6 8
were overruled. The Board stated that the effect given the statute
by California courts for inheritance under California law is not
controlling with respect to an immigration question because the
69
latter involves the application of federal standards.
In Buenaventura the Board ruled that the father's action in taking his natural children into his home in the Philippines did not
legitimate them for the purposes of section 101(b) (1) (C) because
neither the father nor the children were living in California at the
time. Therefore, California had no nexus with the parties at the
time the alleged legitimating acts occurred. However, after the father moved to California, the children took up residence with
their paternal grandmother in the Philippines. The Board found
that this latter action constituted reception into the father's family and did result in legitimation for section 101(b) (1) (C) purposes because the father was domiciled in California at the time
and the children were still under the age of eighteen.
One federal district court in California has differed with the
Board's approach to section 230.70 The case involved a child who
was born out of wedlock in Yugoslavia in 1934. The child lived
with his natural father and mother in Yugoslavia from 1934 until
1941. The father then moved to the United States and eventually
established a domicile in California in 1953, when the child was
nineteen. The father acknowledged his son's birth to the Yugoslavian authorities in 1958, thereby establishing legitimacy under
the law of Yugoslavia.7 1 However, by this time his son was
twenty-four years old.
The Board denied a petition submitted by the father to have his
son classified as a legitimated child under section 101(b) (1) (C) of
the Act.7 2 The district court reversed the Board's decision and or68. In re Garcia, 12 L & N. Dec. 628 (1968); In re Pableo, 12 L & N. Dec. 503
(1967) (decided by Dist. Dir.).
69. See also In re Varian, ID. No. 2395 (1975), involving an interesting discus-

sion of a claim under former § 230 of the California Civil Code in a nationality context.
70. Kaliski v. District Director, No. 75-2712 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 1977), appeal
docketed, No. 78-1714 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 1978).

71. See In re Jancar, 11 L & N. Dec. 365 (1965).
72. In re Kaliski, File No. A19 907 908 (Aug. 5, 1974), motionfor reconsideration
denied, (July 14, 1975). It is interesting to note that the Board decisions deal only
with the issue of legitimation under the Yugoslavian law and do not discuss § 230
of the California Civil Code. The brief ified in support of Mr. Kaliski's motion for
reconsideration also failed to mention § 230.

dered the visa petition approved. The court held that the legitimating acts under section 230 of the California Civil Code took
place during the first seven years of the child's life, between 1934
and 1941, when he resided with his natural parents in Yugoslavia.
The court pointed out that under the California law, the acts prescribed by section 230 need not have been performed within California so long as the father later became domiciled in the state.73
The court purportedly found it unnecessary to consider the theory of retroactivity advanced by the petitioner. Instead, it relied
upon a perceived distinction between "legitimating acts" and
"those which activate the legal process" and upon the further perceived distinction between legitimation "under" the law of California and legitimation "by" the law of California. The court held
that the child was legitimated under the law of California during
the first seven years of his life, thereby fulfilling the requirement
of section 101(b) (1) (C), and that he was legitimated by the law of
California when the petitioner established domicile there.
Legal Custody
Section 101(b) (1) (C) requires that the legitimated child be "in
the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time
of such legitimation."7 4 The language of this section has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1952. The legislative
history offers no specific guidance as to the meaning that Congress intended to attach to the term "legal custody."7 5 It is apparent, however, that Congress generally was concerned about the
possibility of fraud.76 It therefore is likely that the "legal custody"
requirement was intended to prevent a claim of legitimation by a
man who had little or no contact with the child and whose motive
was circumvention of immigration restrictions. 77
Early Board decisions ignored the legal custody requirement.
In no published decision prior to 1970 was a petition in behalf of a
legitimated child denied solely for failure to fulfil the legal cus73. See In re Estate of Lund, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945).

74. See note 1 supra.
75. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.209 (1949). A similar definition was used in the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 102(h), 54 Stat. 1137 (repealed 1952). However, the legislative history of that Act is also silent as to the meaning and purpose of the legal
custody requirement. See H.R. REP. No. 2396, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). This
provision does not appear to have been derived from earlier immigration laws.
The term "legal custody" is also used in connection with adoptions under L & N.
Act § 101(b) (1) (E), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (E) (1976). See note 1 supra.
76. See authorities cited notes 44-46 and accompanying text supra.
77. See In re Dela Rosa, 14 L & N. Dec. 728, 730 (1974) (dissenting opinion); In
re Harris, ID. No. 2308, at 10-11 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
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tody requirement.7 8
In the majority of reported cases, status was denied because
the requirements for legitimation under the applicable domestic
law had not been met.79 In several cases, status was denied for
failure to meet the age requirements. 80 In one case, the Board assumed consent on the part of the natural mother to legitimation
by the natural father and found that such consent constituted
agreement to transfer custody to the natural father.81 In another
case, the Attorney General assumed that legal custody had been
satisfied where the child lived in the same household with his
natural parents.8 2 In the remainder of the reported cases, status
was granted without discussion of how the legal custody requirement had been met. Several of these cases merit amplification.
In In re K.,83 the child was born out of wedlock in Poland. The
natural father left Poland permanently when the child was three
months old. He acknowledged the child in 1948 by sending a document to the Polish authorities while he was in England and the
child was still in Poland. The Board granted the petition without
any mention of legal custody.
In In re G.,84 the child was born out of wedlock in Hungary. A
short time later, the natural father in Hungary acknowledged the
child as his own, thereby effecting legitimation under Hungarian
law. The Board found that the requirements of section
101(b) (1) (C) had been met and granted the petition. No question
was raised over legal custody at the time of legitimation.
In In re Chojnowski,85 the child was born out of wedlock in Poland. The Board held that acknowledgement by the natural father
78. Only a small number of the Board's decisions are designated as precedents and published in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1978). However, a search
of those unpublished decisions indexed by the Board and maintained in the
Board's library also revealed no pre-1970 decision turning solely on the legal custody issue.
79. See, e.g., In re Adam &Augustine, 13 L &N. Dec. 177 (1969); In re Chong, 13
L &N. Dec. 45 (1968); In re Monma, 12 1. & N. Dec. 265 (1967); In re Mandewirth, 12
L & N. Dec. 199 (1967); In re Anastasiadis, 12 L &N. Dec. 99 (1967).
80. See, e.g., In re Sinclair, 13 I. & N. Dec. 613 (1970); In re Doble-Pena, 13 L &
N. Dec. 366 (1969); In re Palacio, 11 I. & N. Dec. 132 (1965).
81. In re W., 7 L & N. Dec. 373 (1956).
82. In re K-W-S, 9 L & N. Dec. 396 (1961) (decided by Att'y Gen.).
83. 8 L & N. Dec. 73 (1958). See text accompanying note 17 supra for additional discussion of this case.
84. 9 L &N. Dec. 518 (1961).
85. 11 L &N. Dec. 287 (1965).

in Poland established the child's status as a legitimate child
under Polish law. The Board did not mention legal custody.
In In re Jancar,86 the natural father in Yugoslavia acknowledged the child when the child was five months old. The natural
father then left Yugoslavia, never to return. One of the grounds
that the District Director relied upon to deny the petition was
that the child had not come within the legal custody of the father
until the child entered the United States at the age of twenty.
The Board held that the child became legitimated under Yugoslavian law by the father's act of acknowledgement and that she
qualified as either a legitimate or a legitimated child. The Board
did not raise the legal custody requirement although the District
Director had mentioned it in his denial.
In In re Kubicka,87 the Board held that under the law of Poland
a child born in that country of a bigamous marriage was legitimated by the act of the father in making a report of the child's
birth to the civil registry office. No mention was made of the child
being in the legal custody of the father at the time of legitimation.
In a number of cases involving children legitimated under section
230 of the California Civil Code, the Board also did not indicate
how the legal custody requirement had been satisfied.88
The first published Board decision denying an application for
status because of failure to meet the legal custody requirement
was In re Harris.89 That case involved an attempted judicial legitimation in Liberia while the natural father was in the United
States. The Board denied the petition on several grounds, including that the legitimation decree named as the child's father the
grandfather, Mr. Harris, Sr., rather than the natural father, Mr.
Harris, Jr. With respect to the legal custody requirement, the
Board stated:
We may ask what Congress meant by 'legal custody.' There are, of
course, several kinds and degrees of custody. 'Legal custody' implies either a natural right or a court decree. It is a settled principle of law that
the mother of an illegitimate child has the primary right to its custody,
and we cannot presume that she has lost custody. A mother may be de86. 11 L & N. Dec. 365 (1965).
87. 14 L & N. Dec. 303 (1972). See text accompanying note 22 supra for additional discussion of this case.
88. In re Garcia, 12 L & N. Dec. 628 (1968); In re Pableo, 12 L & N. Dec. 503
(1967) (decided by Dist. Dir.); In re Palacio, 11 I. &N. Dec. 183 (1965); In re DeF., 6
L & N. Dec. 325 (1954). See also In re Sandin-Nava, 14 I. & N. Dec. 88 (1972), in
which the Board held that a child born of a bigamous marriage in California was
"legitimate" under I. & N. Act § 101(b) (1) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (A) (1970). See
note 1 supra.
89. LD. No. 2308 (1970). Although In re Harris was decided in 1970, it was not

designated for publication under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) until 1974, after the decision in
In re Dela Rosa, 14 I & N. Dec. 728 (1974), which relied upon Harris.
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90
prived of the custody of her child but not without cause.

Applying the foregoing principles, the Board found that the
child had been in the actual custody of the mother at the time of
legitimation and that the court decree had not awarded legal custody to the father. The Board concluded that the legal custody requirement had not been met and dismissed the appeal from the
denial of the petition.
The chairman of the Board, Maurice Roberts, filed a dissenting
opinion in which Board Member Louisa Wilson joined. The dissent took the position that the term "legal custody" is broader
and more inclusive than terms such as "actual custody," "physical
custody," or "custody." Under this view, "legal custody" includes
constructive as well as actual relationships. The dissent found
that the natural father had done all that he could to fulfil his legal
obligations toward his child, that the mother had expressly consented to the legitimation, and that there was no reason to suspect the kind of fraud which had motivated Congress to impose
the "legal custody" requirement in the first place.9 1
The "legal custody" issue arose again in In re Dela Rosa,92
which involved a child born out of wedlock in Panama, a country
that has abolished all distinctions based on legitimacy. The father
declared paternity before an official of the civil registry when his
daughter was six months old, thereby establishing her legitimacy
under Panamanian law.9 3

He supported the child from birth.

When the child was nine, the father immigrated to the United
States. A visa was issued for the child at that time, but she did
not go with her father because her mother did not wish her to
leave Panama. Later, the mother agreed that the child should join
her father in the United States.
Following the reasoning set forth in Harris, the Board found
that "legal custody" required either a natural right or a court decree and that the father had neither. Therefore, it denied the petition in behalf of his daughter.
Chairman Roberts, joined by Board Member Wilson, again dissented. In addition to reiterating and expanding upon the arguments in the Harris dissent, Chairman Roberts found that the
90.
91.
92.
93.

LD. No. 2308, at 4.
Id. at 11-12 (dissenting opinion).
14 L &N. Dec. 728 (1974).
See In re Sinclair, 13 L &N. Dec. 613 (1970).

majority had established a rule that in the absence of a court decree, the natural father could never have legal custody of his legitimated child as long as the natural mother was alive and had not
clearly abandoned the child. He pointed out that the father had
taken all necessary steps to establish his daughter's legitimacy
under the law of Panama years prior to his immigration to this
country and that he had obviously taken an interest in her upbringing. Noting the remedial nature of section 101(b)(1)(C),94

Chairman Roberts declared that he did not believe that the majority's result was in accordance with the congressional intent. He
concluded his dissent by pointing out that the Board's decision
was inconsistent with the results reached in numerous other
cases, citing inter alia In re K.95 and In re Jancar.96
Legal custody subsequently was an issue in In re
Buenaventura.97 In this case the natural mother left her children
with their paternal grandmother in the Philippines to be raised by
the grandmother and supported by their natural father, who was
in California. The Board held that legal custody was in the natural father notwithstanding his absence. The Board cited an Attorney General opinion 98 recognizing that the right of a putative
father to the custody of his illegitimate child is superior to that of
everyone but the mother.
Buenaventura indicates that the Board will not necessarily
equate actual custody with physical custody. However, the impact of this decision appears to be limited to situations in which
the natural mother has clearly relinquished her right to custody.
It evidently does not extend to a situation in which a natural father has legitimated his child without obtaining an express or implied release of legal custody from the natural mother.
Under the Board's rulings it may be difficult for a natural father
to legitimate his child for immigration purposes unless he obtains
a simultaneous court order awarding him legal custody. In jurisdictions that have completely abolished the status of illegitimacy,
"legitimating acts" ordifiarily would not involve such a court decree. Therefore, children born out of wedlock in such jurisdictions may have a more difficult time qualifying for immigration
benefits through their natural fathers than children born out of
wedlock in countries with less liberal laws.
94. See also In re K-W-S, 9 L & N. Dec. 396 (1961) (decided by Att'y Gen.), in
which the Attorney General emphasized the remedial nature of § 101(b) (1) (C)
and the congressional intent to preserve and maintain the family unit.
95. 8 L & N. Dec. 73 (1958). See text accompanying notes 17 & 83 supra.
96. 11 L & N. Dec. 365 (1965). See text accompanying note 86 supra.
97. LD. No. 2636 (1977). See text accompanying note 67 supra.
98. 31 Op. ATr'y GmN. 162 (1920).
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STEPCHLDREN

There is another way in which certain illegitimate children may
qualify for benefits under the definition of "child" contained in
the Act. This way is through the "stepchild" definition contained
in section 101(b) (1) (B).99 Under certain circumstances, an illegitimate child can qualify as a "stepchild" if his natural father marries a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident alien.
As mentioned earlier, Congress in 1957 amended section
101(b) (1) of the Act to overcome certain rulings by the Attorney
General that refused to recognize the relationship between an illegitimate child and his mother.100 The amended law defines a
"child" as including a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the child had not reached the age of eighteen at the
time the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred.1o'
The administrative authorities initially took the view that the
amended statute did not permit a female citizen to petition for
her husband's illegitimate child as her stepchild.102 This interpretation was based on their reading of the legislative history of the
amendments to section 101(b) (1) as indicating a congressional intent to grant immigration benefits only to those illegitimate chil03
dren seeking status through their natural mothers.1
However, a judge in the Southern District of New York dis0
4 the court
agreed with that interpretation. In Nation v. Esperdy,1
found that a citizen wife could have her husband's alien illegitimate child classified as her "stepchild" under section
101(b) (1) (B). The court cited the lack of a statutory limitation on
the qualification of an illegitimate child as a stepchild and the inconclusiveness of the legislative history of the 1957 amendments.
The court noted that the wife, her husband, and the child made
up a close family unit.
The Board thereafter adopted the Nation decision, stating that
Nation would be applied where the facts spelled out a close family unit such as was present in that case. 0 5 However, another
99. See note 1 supra.

100.
101.
102.
103.
Cong.,
104.
105.

See notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (B) (1976).
See In re W., 7 L & N. Dec. 685 (1958).
See S. REP. No. 1057, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); H.R& REP. No. 1199, 85th
1st Sess. (1957).
239 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
In re The, 11 L & N. Dec. 449 (1965).

judge in the Southern District of New York disagreed with the
Board's revised interpretation. In Andrade v. Esperdy,1O6 the
court held that the plain language of the statute required approval of a stepchild petition submitted by a citizen wife for her
husband's alien illegitimate child regardless of whether there had
been a close family unit.
The Board declined to adopt the Andrade decision and continued to apply the "close family unit" rule everywhere but in the
Southern District of New York. 0 7 In that district the Board followed the Andrade rule and did not require the showing of a
close family unit. 0 8 The Board's reasoning in declining to adopt

the Andrade rule was that: (1) Congress did not intend the result
reached in Andrade, (2) the Board was not obliged to follow a
lower federal court ruling in other jurisidictions, (3) the Government's failure to appeal Andrade did not necessarily indicate acquiescence, and (4) such action would preserve the issue for
judicial review in other jurisdictions.109 However, no other jurisdiction considered the issue. In connection with pending cases,
the INS has now taken the position that it is willing to apply the
Andrade decision on a nationwide basis.
The Board never defined "close family unit."110 Nevertheless, it

is clear that a period of residence by the stepmother with the
child was required."' In an unpublished decision, the Board rejected the notion that a stepmother's demonstrated interest in the
child, short of actually living with it, could satisfy the "close fam2
ily unit" test.1 1
Other Board rulings deal with the question of adulterine
stepchildren. The Board originally ruled that a child born of an
adulterous relationship could not qualify as a stepchild under the
Nation rule.113 The rationale was that the adulterine child had
been born subsequent to the marriage creating the alleged
"steprelationship."
106. 270 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
107. In re Amado &Monteiro, 13 I. & N. Dec. 179 (1969); In re Soares, 12 I. &N.
Dec. 653 (1968).
108. In re Amado & Monteiro, 13 I. & N. Dec. 179 (1969); See In re Soares, 12 L &
N. Dec. 653 (1968).
109. In re Amado & Monteiro, 13 L & N. Dec. 179, 181 (1969). Regarding the
Board's obligation to adopt lower court rulings nationwide, see generally In re
Lira, 13 L & N. Dec. 169 (1969).

110. The "close family unit" test is not applied to other steprelationships.
111. In re Harris, ID. No. 2308 (1970); In re Amado & Monteiro, 13 L & N. Dec.
179 (1969); In re Soares, 12 I. & N. Dec. 653 (1968); In re Morris, 11 L & N. Dec. 537

(1966).
112. In re Gordon, File No. A19 397 327 (Dec. 17, 1975).
113. In re Young, 12 I. & N. Dec. 544 (1967); In re Young, 12 L & N. Dec. 340
(1967); In re Green, 11 L & N. Dec. 546 (1965).
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In In re Stultz,114 however, the Board reversed itself and held
that an adulterine child should be treated the same as any other
illegitimate child for the purpose of determining whether a
stepchild relationship exists. In granting the petition submitted
by a United States citizen in behalf of the daughter born of her
husband's adulterous relationship, the Board noted that the petitioner had cared for the child since her abandonment by her natural mother, thus satisfying the "close family unit" test.
The INS requested that Stultz be certified to the Attorney General for review." 5 The Attorney General affirmed the Board's decision. In doing so, he cited the Andrade decision several times
with approval but without indicating awareness of the Board's rejection of its reasoning." 6
RECENT LEGISLATIvE PROPosALs

In the last two Congresses, bills have been introduced by Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman (D-N.Y.) to amend section
101(b) (1) of the Act to allow an illegitimate child to be classified
as the "child" of either of its natural parents. The first of these
bills, H.R. 10993,117 was introduced in the 94th Congress.
Hearings on this bill were held before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Judiciary Committee on July 28, 1976.118 At that time, the Department
of Justice witness expressed sympathy for the objectives of the
bill along with an awareness of judicial decisions extending the
rights of illegitimate children and their natural fathers in areas
other than immigration." 9 Nevertheless, the Department of Justice raised concerns that enactment of the bill would increase
114. LD. No. 2401 (1974, 1975) (afrd by Att'y Gen. 1975).
115. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1) (iii) (1978).
116. The Board did not initially interpret Stultz as having any impact on its decision not to adopt Andrade. See In re Bourne, LD. No. 2618 (1977). As this article
goes to press, the Board has not yet had an opportunity to rule on the INS position
that Andrade should be applied on a nationwide basis.
117. HR. 10993, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 38743 (1975). In introducing the bill, Congresswoman Holtzman characterized § 101(b)(1) of the Act as
'"blatant sex discrimination" that was unconstitutional. 121 CONG. REc. 38743
(1975).
118. Review of Immigration Problems: Hearings on H.R. 10993 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship,and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on

the Judiciary,94th Cong., Ist &2d Sess. 131 (1975-1976).
119. Id. at 149, 158 (statement of Hon. Leonard L.F. Chapman, Jr.). See cases
cited note 3 supra.

opportunities for immigration fraud and place greater administrative burdens on the INS and on the Department of State in attempting to detect fraud. 1 20 The Justice Department
recommended that the bill contain some safeguards to reduce the
possibility of immigration fraud and suggested that such a safeguard might consist of a requirement of two years' residence with
the illegitimate child.12 1 In view of the concern over possible sex
discrimination, the Department recommended that this residence
requirement be applicable to both fathers and mothers of ilegitimates.122
During the hearing, Congresswoman Holtzman questioned the
need for the residency requirement.123 She and Subcommittee
Chairman Joshua Eilberg (D-Pa.) pointed out that the INS already makes determinations of paternity in the cases of illegitimate stepchildren and therefore must have developed some
evidentiary standards to guard against fraud.124 The Subcommittee asked the Departments of Justice and State to submit draft
regulations that would govern the proof of paternity if H.R. 10993
were enacted. 125 No further action was taken on the bill during
the 94th Congress.
Congresswoman Holtzman introduced an identical bill, H.R.
409,126 at the beginning of the 95th Congress. The Department of

Justice report on that bill expressed no opposition to the concept
of equal treatment for illegitimate children claiming status
through their natural fathers.127 Although not renewing the suggestion for a two-year residency requirement, the report stated
that the bill should give to the Attorney General and to the Secretary of State specific authority to promulgate regulations setting
forth standards for proving paternity.
While H.R. 409 was pending, the Supreme Court decided Fiallo
v. Bell,128 upholding the constitutionality of section 101(b) (1) (C).
120. Review of ImmigrationProblems: Hearings on H.R. 10993 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship,and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 149, 158 (1975-1976) (statement of Hon.
Leonard LF. Chapman, Jr.).
121. Id. at 149, 158-59.
122. Id. at 149, 159.
123. Id. at 154-55.
124. Id. at 139-41, 153-55.
125. Id. at 149-50. These draft regulations are set forth in id. at 150-53.
126. H.L 409, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. H60 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1977).
See 121 CONG. REc. H60 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman).
127. Letter from Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, to Peter W. Rodino, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (June 9,
1977).
128. 430 U.S. 787 (1977). See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra for a discus-

sion of Fiallo.
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Among other contentions, the plaintiffs had argued to the Court
that section 101(b) (1) (C) was based on outmoded sexual stereotypes and on unrealistic notions regarding the difficulty of establishing paternity. The Court responded that such arguments
"should be addressed to the Congress rather than the Courts."129
The Court also took note of the pending bill that would have eliminated the challenged distinction. 30
CONCLUSION

Congress has virtually unlimited power to determine the statutory system for the admission of aliens into the United States, including the admission of alien relatives of United States citizens
and lawful permanent resident aliens. The present system
originated in 1952, and with respect to the rights of children born
out of wedlock has not been changed materially since 1957. The
Supreme Court has held that denying natural fathers and their illegitimate children the benefits which are granted to natural
mothers and to their illegitimate children is not a violation of any
constitutional guarantee.
It is unlikely that Congress contemplated some of the difficult
issues that have arisen under the statute, especially in relation to
those jurisdictions which have abolished the status of illegitimacy. Reconciling such domestic laws with a statute phrased in
terms of "legitimate" or "legitimated" has been a difficult task.
The Board has opted for an interpretation that utilizes the generally understood concept of a "legitimate" child as one born in
wedlock. However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has disagreed with respect to children born in the People's Republic of China, ruling that all such children are legitimate at
birth.
There are a number of ways by which an illegitimate child may
attain immigration status through his natural parents. The first
way is to claim status through the natural mother. The Act recognizes this relationship. A second way is through legitimation by
the natural father while under the age of eighteen. This method
129. 430 U.S. at 799 n.9.
130. I. Congresswoman Holtzman, expressed disappointment in the Court's
decision and called upon her colleagues to pass the pending bill in order to overcome that decision. 123 CONG. REc. H11,901 (daily ed. May 10, 1977) (remarks of

Rep. Holtzman).

requires showing a proper nexus with the jursidiction under
whose law legitimation is claimed. One district court has declined
to accept the Board's requirement that such a nexus must have
existed at the time the legitimating acts took place, thereby allowing a petitioner to assert legitimation by later moving to the
jurisdiction. The legitimating father must also establish that he
had "legal custody" through either a court decree or a relinquishment of rights by the natural mother.
A third option for attaining status is through the stepchild provision if the natural father marries a citizen or a lawful permanent resident. Board decisions required a "close family
unit"-involving residence together by the stepmother, the father,
and the illegitimate child. In the Southern District of New York,
however, stepchild status was recognized administratively without a showing of a close family unit. The INS has now indicated
that it is unwilling to have the Board adopt the latter rule on a
nationwide basis.
Finally, the House of Representatives had identical bills before
it during each of the last two sessions which would have amended
the Act to grant immigration benefits to natural fathers and to
their illegitimate children. While voicing some concerns regarding increased opportunities for fraud, the executive branch has
not opposed the concept of equal treatment underlying these
bills. Although hearings were held in the 94th Congress, the
measure has never reached the floor of the House.

